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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court originally had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-2-2(3) (j) (1953 as amended).1 The 
court currently has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to a 
remand from Utah Supreme Court following a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari having been filed by Defendant/Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a final order from the Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Kane County, State of Utah, entered by 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, on February 20, 1992. The case itself 
involved an attempt by the plaintiff to renew a judgement original-
ly entered against the defendant and First National Credit Corp. on 
March 26, 1982. The final order of Judge Tibbs granted plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied a Motion for Summary 
Judgment made by the defendant. 
In an opinion dated August 10, 1993, this court dismissed 
Defendant's/Appellant's appeal on the basis of his failure to serve 
a thirty-day jail sentence in the Kane County Jail for contempt of 
court.2 This contempt of court order was issued in supplemental 
proceedings to the original judgment in this matter. Following the 
dismissal of his appeal, Defendant/Appellant filed a Petition for 
1
 Hereafter all references to the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED shall be to 
the 1953 as amended version. 
2
 A copy of the opinion is reproduced as Addendum "A' and 
attached hereto. 
Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. By Order dated 1st 
day of December, 1993, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter 
to this court for further briefing.3 By order dated 7th day of 
January, 1994 this Court ordered the parties to brief three 
specific sub-issues.4 This memorandum is submitted in response to 
the Court's Order 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This memorandum addressed three specific sub-issues which this 
Court has requested Defendant/Appellant to brief. These issues are 
issues that have not previously been addressed, and consequently 
any review of the issues involved is done de novo. 
1. Does this Courts opinion in D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 
590 (Utah App. 1990) require a thirty-day grace period for 
contumacious litigants? 
2. If a thirty-day grace period is otherwise required, 
whether it may be dispensed with in situations where it is 
physically impossible for a defendant to bring himself in a timely 
compliance with a trial court's order in process, including in a 
situation where defendant is incarcerated out of state. 
3
 A copy of the Minute Entry is reproduced and attached hereto 
as Addendum "B". 
4
 A copy of the Order is reproduced and attached hereto as 
Addendum "C". 
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3. If incarceration out of state might in some instance 
preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period longer than 
thirty-day, whether the results should be different in cases where 
defendant had amply opportunity, pre-incarceration, to discharge 
the contempt sanction pending against him. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are 
reproduced here in as Addendum "D". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an attempt by the Plaintiff to renew 
a judgment entered jointly and severally, against Mr. Thomas and 
First National Credit Corp., on March 26, 1982. The complaint in 
this case was filed on December 31, 1990. 
After having unsuccessfully attempted to have the Defendant, 
Mr. Thomas, personally served at his home in Wyoming, the Plaintiff 
moved the Court ex parte for an order permitting service by 
publication. That order was granted by the court, and service was 
effected thereby. 
Mr. Thomas appeared specially by way of a motion to quash the 
service by publication. That motion was denied, and Mr. Thomas 
subsequently filed his answer. After filing his answer, Mr. Thomas 
moved to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitations, 
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release under the Joint Obligors Act, lack of jurisdiction, and 
failure to mitigate damages. This motion to dismiss was denied. 
Mr. Thomas made a petition for interlocutory appeal of the 
Trial Court's refusal to grant the motion to dismiss, but the 
Supreme Court refused to grant the petition. The Plaintiff brought 
a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Thomas replied and filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment. After oral argument, on the 
date scheduled for trial, the Trial Court denied Mr. Thomas' motion 
for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment to the Plain-
tiff. 
This case is an appeal from the court's final order granting 
Plaintiff's summary judgment, and denying summary judgment to Mr. 
Thomas• 
Mr. Thomas made a timely appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3) (j) . Notice of Appeal was filed 
March 2, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court, on September 30, 1992 
poured the matter over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On 
March 10, 1993, a notice of oral argument was sent to respective 
counsel setting oral argument for June 24, 1993 at 1:30 p.m. On 
June 15, 1993, the court entered an order requiring the parties' 
submit simultaneous memoranda advising the court of facts relevant 
to a prior contempt order issued against Mr. Thomas "and explaining 
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why the appeal should or should not be stayed." Respective counsel 
filed the memoranda as required. 
On June 24, 1993, oral argument was had before this Court with 
a portion of that argument, at the Court's direction, being 
addressed to the issue of why the matter should not be stayed. On 
June 10, 1993, this Court filed an opinion wherein Mr. Thomas' 
appeal was dismissed. 
Defendant/Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
with the Utah Supreme Court requesting a review of this Court's 
decision. By Order dated 1st day of December, 1993, this matter 
was remanded to the Utah Court of Appeals for further briefing on 
the issue of whether Mr. Thomas' failure to serve his sentence 
should result in a dismissal of his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Defendant, Harry Edward Thomas ("Mr. Thomas") is, and 
has been since 1966, a legal resident of the state of Wyoming. R. 
203. 
2. Mr. Thomas has maintained his exclusive residence in the 
state of Wyoming since 1984. R. 155; R. 116. 
3. Plaintiff, Richard W. Von Hake as trustee of the Von Hake 
1987 Trust, is a resident of the state of Nevada. R. 128-135. 
4. The Von Hake 1987 Trust is a Nevada trust. R. 132-135. 
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5. The sole purported basis for "standing" of the Plaintiff 
to bring this action are the duly executed documents of the Von 
Hake 1987 Trust together with their attachments and schedules. R. 
128-129. 
6. This case arises out of an attempt by the Plaintiff to 
renew a judgment entered jointly and severally against Mr. Thomas 
and First National Credit Corp. ("First National") on March 26, 
1982. R. 209. 
7. Plaintiff in the above-referenced case was Richard A. Von 
Hake, who was the grantor of the Von Hake 1987 Trust. R.129. 
8. Shortly after the judgment was entered, First National 
filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. R.209. 
9. The judgment entered against Mr. Thomas and First 
National was in the sum of $987,445.50 plus post-judgment interest. 
R.209. 
10. Approximately 18 months after the entry of judgment, Von 
Hake commenced supplemental proceedings to discovery the where-
abouts of Thomas' assets. Opinion Pages 1-2. 
11. During the course of the proceedings, the trial court 
entered both civil and criminal contempt orders for failure to 
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provide certain tax returns and to appear before the court as 
ordered•5 
12. Thomas appealed the judgments of contempt, and on appeal 
the Utah Supreme Court struck down the civil contempt but affirmed 
the criminal contempt, order of the trial court. Von Hake vs. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
13. Mr. Thomas has never served the thirty (30) days in the 
Kane County Jail. Opinion Page 2. 
14. The complaint which forms the basis of this current 
action was filed on December 31, 1990. R.l. 
15. No actual physical service of process was made on Mr. 
Thomas in this action but service was made by publication pursuant 
to an order of the trial court dated February 27, 1991. R. 17-18. 
16. Mr. Thomas sought to have said service quashed, but his 
motion to quash was denied by the trial court. R. 28-29; R. 45-46. 
17. Trial was originally scheduled on the renewal of judgment 
in February of 1992. Prior to the beginning of trial, the court 
took argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
Thereafter the trial court granted summary judgment to the Plain-
tiff/Appellee, Richard Von Hake, Trustee of the Von Hake 1987 
Trust. R. 208-214. 
5A detailed description of the events leading to the trial 
court's decision holding Thomas in contempt of court can be found 
in Von Hake vs. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1164-66 (Utah 1988). 
7 
18. On March 2, 1992, Defendant/Appellant Edward Thomas filed 
a notice of appeal. R.219. 
19. The appeal was originally taken to the Utah Supreme 
Court, but was poured over to the Court of Appeals. 
20. On June 15, 1993, the parties were ordered to brief the 
issue of why Mr. Thomas' appeal should not be stayed due to his 
failure to satisfy the prior contempt order issued by Judge Tibbs. 
Order of June 15, 1993. 
21. On August 10, 1993, this Court issued an opinion 
dismissing Mr. Thomas7 appeal. Addendum "A". 
22. On the 2nd day of December, 1993, the Utah Supreme Court 
issued a Minute Entry remanding this case back the to Utah Court of 
Appeals for further briefing. Addendum "B". 
23. On the 7th day of January, 1994 this Court ordered the 
parties to brief three specific issues. Addendum "C". 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This matter is back before the court for a determination of 
whether or not it is appropriate to dismiss Mr. Thomas7 appeal on 
the basis of his being a contumacious litigant. As will be shown 
in detail in the brief below, a dismissal is not appropriate in 
this case for a number of reasons. 
First, dismissal is not appropriate because this Court's 
ruling in D'Aston v.D'Aston requires a grace period before 
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dismissal of an appeal where, contumacious litigant may come 
into compliance v grace 
period was available in this case, and indeed partis h 
i 'Hi injin«.fr" I i IMJ uvtl ed lu Lhe cour t that neither appella; ' : appellee 
were in tavoi of a s.^v. 
The reason for the requirement of '' time period to come into 
comp. !L » uide is that the Utah Constitu-
tion guarantees- -: individual an appea 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over 
the cause ; -• 1 denies right. 
This i» not to r,;J appellate courts 
dismiss the appeals of contumacious appellants who refuse to comply 
with the appellate i-'uni « . ji <J• >i. „•  11 i .<i- her to say I hal ••111 
individual before having his appeal dismissed must 
opportunity t.o obey the appellate court's order prior" to dismissal 
being appropriate. 
The next issue before this court is whether the dismissal 
oropriate where it is physically impossible for nf 
appellant i bring himseli into I • nu«J ^  '* l,|,llJ"' * dlMI"'*•' w i l l 
court's order Previous decisions Supreme Court, 
deaJ in | wi 1 In I lii the service - - **«- :n contempt 
situations clearly hold that; I he aeren^; 
performance as of the time the sanction is to be imposed is always 
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available. Since the time for measuring whether the impossibility 
exists is the time that the sanction is to be imposed, the defense 
of impossibility would be available to Mr. Thomas in this case. 
This court sua sponte raised the issue of Mr. Thomas7 previous 
contempt at a period of time after his incarceration in Boron 
California. From that time to the present, it has been outside of 
Mr. Thomas' control to comply with the trial court's order that he 
serve thirty-days in the Kane County Jail. 
The final issue which this court requested be addressed is, 
whether the fact that Mr. Thomas had a prior ability to comply with 
the court order and failed to do so invalidates a later defense of 
impossibility. The answer to this question is again clearly no. 
Because the time for the determination of the validity of the 
defense of impossibility is at the time the sanction is to be 
entered, an individual's prior ability to comply or prior actions 
are irrelevant. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 
1981). 
Because Mr. Thomas had no present ability to perform at the 
time this court sought to enter its sanction of dismissal of his 
appeal, dismissal would not be an appropriate remedy in this case. 
Wherefore the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests this court 
rescind its previous order of dismissal and address this case on 
its merits. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
L QMDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 'mib CAbh, DISMISSAL IS NOT 
Ml APPROPRIATE SANCTION. 
AJI. D'Aston Requires a Ihirt , . ^^ ^-, Period For 
Contumacious Litigants. 
D'Aston v. D'Aston, is uuc 
first Utah Appellate Court ;3.<c to address - ,*~ : whether ^ n 
appellate Dpeal when the appellant J± 
contempt of . _a court order 
593. 
After cniui clonal Law# Utah Criminal 
Lawf and a review from other jurisdiction 
held that under certain circumstances, a party helri . ; contempt v 
lower court could I I i I • 111• •- m I 
appellant has submitted to the process of the trial cour 
further indicated that failure * ;: e\ 
Appellate Court' -^ could .testill in I ln> i ^ LUC 
appeal. D'Aston at • • . 
r
' '
 l ,
« e I'M '•! >( decision this Court detailed its methodology in 
coming * . the conclusion .arid holding . ,. .-*.-^  
included ~eview aw of other jurisdictions across 
COUJI1 -liliij" issues. This Court found some 
jurisdictions which dismissed the civiJ appeal; I run I iu-n mi -, 
parties without allowing the parties .in opportunity bring 
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themselves into compliance with the trial court's order. It found 
some jurisdictions that have allowed the party time to comply with 
the trial court's order before dismissing the appeal, and the court 
found still a third group whose approach was to stay the appeal 
until the appellant has submitted to the process of the trial 
court. D'Aston at 593. After reviewing the three positions this 
Court held: 
We are persuaded that the Closset approach is most 
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's Tuttle decision 
and the United States Supreme Court's Arnold decision. 
By adopting this approach we do not deny Appellant her 
right to an appeal under Utah Constitution Article VIII, 
§5, but rather insist that she must submit herself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy that court's 
concerns before she may exercise that right. 
D'Aston at 594. 
The Closset decision referred to in the previous quote is the 
case of Closset v. Closset, 71 Nevada 80, 280 P.2d 290, 292 (1955). 
This case is one cited for the third proposition that the court 
should stay the appeal until the Appellant has submitted to process 
of the trial court. 
This Court correctly reasoned that this third approach is most 
in line with the only prior related Utah court decisions and is 
further the only approach in line with the provisions of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
This Courts analysis of the Tuttle case is particularly 
enlightening. In D'Aston this Court stated: 
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Likewise, Utah's appellate courts have not consid-
ered whether they may dismiss a civil appeal when the 
appellant is in contempt of a trial court order in the 
same action. However, in the area of criminal appeals, 
the Utah Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal of a 
prisoner after he escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985); See also Hardy i > Morris, 636 
P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) (Court dismissed an escapees 
appeal from a dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In 
Tuttle, the Utah Supreme Court defined its position in 
Hardy. The Court held that am appellant prisoner's 
escape is not an abandonment of his right to an appeal 
and that the dismissal of his appeal is not an appropri-
ate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704-
D'Astor (Emphasis added). 
Constitution guarantees an 
individual "an appeal of right from the coui i ot nriqmal I ' L BU I J-
I ii"' i I B .zourt with appellate jurisdiction over the cause". 
There is no a L leijai, 1, i ' LA1 I In, N I "• ' »,,IL' " «—isdiction over 
the cause. The constitutional provision *^ ai 
11 11 «r ii:1!. M i rhomas the riqhl In appeal - erroneous decision *• 
the Sixth District Court. without 
addressing the merits nf the issues involved would be a denial uJ 
-lht , • • 
This is not to sa\ owever 
without power to dismiss appeals wheie appellants are in ontempt 
.<-*.-' - ^> —-- \ ._ ;* s orders * it does require, 
however there „ • * 4 j.i^  proces a/. 
before a right can be taken from him. Such liim process should 
comprise the type of conditions recognized by this Court in D'Aston 
and, as cited with approval by this Court, by the Nevada Supreme 
Court, in Closset. This requirement is that there be an order from 
the Appellate Court requiring some sort of action on the part of 
the Appellant and an opportunity to comply with the Appellate 
Courts Order. 
B, Dismissal Of The Appeal Is Not Appropriate Where It Is 
Physically Impossible For An Appellant To Bring Himself Into Timely 
Compliance With The Trial Court's Orders And Process. 
The Appellant in this case is currently incarcerated in the 
federal penitentiary in Boron, California. He was so incarcerated 
at the time the issue of his non-compliance was raised by this 
Court. The second sub issue to which counsel were directed to 
address their argument in the January 7, 1994 Order is: 
If a thirty (30) day grace period is otherwise 
required, whether it may be dispensed with in situations 
where it is physically impossible for Defendant to bring 
himself into timely compliance with the trial court's 
orders and process, including in the situation of Defen-
dant's incarceration out of state. 
Appellant would urge the court to re-define this issue. The 
issue is not can the Court do away with the required compliance, 
but whether it is appropriate to dismiss an appeal where an 
appellant is physically incapable of coming into compliance with 
the orders of the trial court. This very issue was addressed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 
528 (Utah 1981). In Bradshaw, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
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When the proposed sanction is coercive imprisonment, 
the defense of impossibility of performance as of the 
time the sanction is to be imposed would always be 
available without regard to how or by whom the condition 
of impossibility occurred. It is obviously repugnant to 
reason and futile to try to coerce an act that the 
contemnor has no present ability to perform, , Conse-
quently, the defense of impossibility Is uniformly held 
available to this type of sanction. In fact, the 
sanction cannot be imposed without an affirmative finding 
of present ability to comply. 
'Empha added). 
D'Aston did threat msmissd I 1 T L-iilur" • 
obey the trial court - orders, * involved a threat of dismissal 
upon * LS Court;, However, as 
the Supreme Court stated in Bradshaw H "repugnant. 
ai: urder knowing that a party physically cannot comply with that 
order. ^ i conformity -e 
waived, but * : the appeal be dismissed, and the answer must be no. 
rr<^ c _r. • ndividua] against whom the appeal 1 s 
sought aismisi-e itional 
considerations come into play. Article I §9 of the Utah Constitu-
i in "iiii provi.d *•",* "excessive bail shall not be requ ired; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; uoi. i\\u\'!!!, I \:i ut!!!! an ::i i mi isi :i,a ] p i in :i shmen ts 
be inflicted, Persons arrested or I mprisoned shall not be treated 
wit in i i i ill n e c e s s a r y r i g o i , •" 
Dismissal of Mr. Thomas' complaint violate 
al provision in two ways, First,, the decision refuse ,„.,„i ,,,!..,«, 
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his appeal is in effect, an affirmance of the wrongful decision of 
the trial court. Effectively, this amounts to a fine in excess of 
One Million Dollars. 
It is Mr. Thomas' contention that the trial court's ruling, 
which imposed a judgment in an amount in excess of One Million 
Dollars is improper as a matter of law. If Mr. Thomas is correct, 
the debt of One Million Dollars against him should no longer exist. 
By denying his right of appeal, this Court effectively strikes Mr. 
Thomas' right of statute of limitations, his challenge that 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest, together with all 
other issues raised in his appeal. The result of the decision is 
no different than if the Court were fining Mr. Thomas over One 
Million Dollars. Clearly it is not contemplated within the 
contempt statutes that a person can be fined in excess of One 
Million Dollars for the type of contempt charged here. 
Dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal also constitutes treatment 
with unnecessary rigor of an individual who is in prison. 
Appellant believes, D'Aston stands for the principal that a grace 
period needs be granted a contumacious litigant, to come in compli-
ance with the trial court's orders, before dismissal is appropri-
ate. Mr. Thomas would have received such an opportunity in this 
case had he not been in prison. Indeed, the original issue raised 
to this Court was whether this matter should be stayed in accor-
16 
dance with this Court's prior decision in D'Aston. The refusal to 
allow Mr. Thomas to appeal is therefore a determination by the 
Court that because Mr. Thomas is in prison, the Court may dismiss 
his appeal inflicting on him a wrongful judgment in excess of One 
Million Dollars. 
Such treatment strikes at the fundamental right to equal 
protection guaranteed under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. Such disparate treatment also clearly violates 
Article I §9 and should therefore not be sanctioned. 
C. Does an appellant's prior ability to comply with the 
trial court's orders invalidate a later defense of impossibility? 
The third issue which this Court requested counsel address is: 
If incarceration out of state might in some instanc-
es preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period 
longer than thirty (30) days, whether the results should 
be different in cases where Defendant had ample opportu-
nity, pre-incarceration, to discharge the contempt 
sanction pending against him. 
The contempt order at issue in this case is a matter of 
criminal contempt which required Mr. Thomas to spend thirty (30) 
days in the Kane County Jail. Since April 12, 1993, Mr. Thomas has 
been incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Boron, California. 
Mr. Thomas' current incarceration makes it physically impossible 
for him to comply with the order of the trial court that Mr. Thomas 
spend thirty (30) days in the Kane County Jail. It is undisputable 
however, that at some time prior to his entry into the Kane County 
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Jail, Mr. Thomas could have and should have, reported to the Kane 
County Jail and served his thirty (30) day sentence. The ability 
of Mr. Thomas to have previously complied with the order of the 
trial court is however, irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
Court of Appeals can or should dismiss Appellant's appeal. 
A dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal is a denial of his rights to 
an appeal. "The right to an appeal is a valuable constitutional 
right and ought not to be denied except where the right has been 
lost or abandoned." Adams on v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
1947). Where a party does not know that he or she is forfeiting 
that right, the right to an appeal should not be taken from them, 
without providing some sort of an opportunity for compliance. It 
has long been recognized in this the State, that the defense of 
impossibility of performance is a sufficient defense to a continu-
ing charge of contempt. For example, in the case of Jeppson v. 
Jeppson, 597 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a future contempt of court cannot be punished without a 
hearing to determine whether performance is protected by the 
doctrine of impossibility. 
In Jeppson, the trial court had adjudicated a husband in 
contempt of court for failure to pay his prior alimony and support 
obligations. The trial court sentenced the husband to serve 15 
days in jail, but suspended the sentence on the basis of prompt 
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payment of the Defendant of future alimony and support obligations. 
The trial court ordered that any future delinquencies would result 
in an immediate institution of the sentence without hearing. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The finding of contempt would not lie if one . . . 
puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with the 
court's order and still wasn't able to do so. . ." 
Jeppson at 1345. 
In this instance, the future punishment this Court seeks to 
impose is the dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Thomas is currently unable to comply with the contempt 
order. Mr. Thomas' previous ability is notf a determining factor. 
The issue is whether Mr. Thomas can comply now when this Court 
seeks to impose an additional sanction. This exact issue was 
addressed in Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981). 
In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the time to 
determine whether the impossibility of performance exists is at the 
time that the sanction is to be imposed. The Court held " . . . the 
defense of impossibility of performance as of the time the sanction 
is to be imposed would always be available, without regard to how 
or by whom the condition of impossibility occurred." Bradshaw at 
531. 
As the Supreme Court clearly stated in Bradshaw, the defense 
of impossibility is available to Mr. Thomas with respect to the 
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sanction of dismissal of his appeal by this Court. Consequently, 
this Court should not dismiss Mr. Thomas' appeal in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
A dismissal of Mr. Thomas7 appeal in this matter would result 
in a violation of his constitutional rights. The sanction of 
dismissal of an appeal is not appropriate without giving an 
individual an opportunity to remedy the condition underlying the 
need for the dismissal. Where it is physically impossible for an 
individual to correct such deficiencies/ irrespective of how that 
impossibility arose, a sanction should not be imposed. 
Both parties in this matter have agreed that if dismissal is 
not appropriate/ they would prefer to have this Court address the 
merits of the appeal at this timef rather than deferring a ruling 
of the appeal until after Mr. Thomas has been released from the 
federal prison and served sentence in the Kane County Jail. Where 
the effect of the stay is to punish not only Mr. Thomas but the 
Appellee as well, such a result would not be appropriate. 
Therefore/ the Defendant/Appellant would respectfully request that 
this Court reverse its prior dismissal and address the merits of 
the appeal which is before it. 
DATED this day of February, 1994. 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
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Shawn D. Turner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ?_ day of February, 1994, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
H. Ralph Klemm 
349 South 200 East, #560 
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ORME, Judge: 
Defendant, Harry Edward Thomas, appeals the summary judgment 
entered against him in plaintiff's action to renew a judgment. 
Due to defendant's long-standing status as a contemner of the 
trial court, we refuse to consider the merits of his appeal and 
instead dismiss it. 
FACTS 
As this case has a long and arduous history, we only discuss 
facts pertinent to our disposition, and not those of the 
underlying dispute or the myriad of arguments Thomas raises in 
the instant appeal. 
In an earlier round of this litigation, appellee's father 
and predecessor in interest, Richard A. Von Hake, obtained a 
substantial judgment for fraud against Thomas. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed that judgment in Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 
(Utah 1985) (Von Hake I). Eighteen months later, because Thomas 
had failed to make payments on the judgment, Von Hake commenced 
supplemental proceedings to discover the whereabouts and extent 
of Thomas's assets. 
During the course of protracted supplemental proceedings, 
the trial court found that Thomas had not complied with its order 
for production and had used improper and dilatory tactics to 
frustrate its orders and to avoid appearing in court. 
Accordingly, the court found Thomas in contempt, sentenced him to 
thirty days in jail, and ordered the issuance of an arrest 
warrant.l 
The court entered a formal order of commitment stating that 
Thomas was guilty of contempt for failing to produce various 
documents and for failing to appear before the court as ordered. 
The Utah Supreme Court stayed execution of the sentence pending 
appeal. 
On appeal, the Court, inter alia, affirmed Thomas's criminal 
contempt conviction. Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 1173 
(Utah 1988) (Von Hake II). The Court released the stay of 
execution and remanded the matter to the trial court for a single 
purpose: "execution of the thirty-day sentence." Id. 
Thomas is now appealing the summary judgment entered against 
him in a proceeding to renew the very judgment affirmed in Von 
Hake I and out of which the contempt determination arose.2 
Nonetheless, to this very day, Thomas has not served the thirty-
day contempt sentence upheld in Von Hake II. Upon learning of 
this state of affairs in the course of reviewing the briefs, we 
requested that both parties file supplemental memoranda addressed 
to the effects of Thomas's outstanding contempt on his present 
appeal in light of our decision in D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 
590 (Utah App. 1990) . In his memorandum, Thomas disclosed he was 
incarcerated on April 12, 1993, in the Federal Penitentiary in 
Boron, California, where he is serving a five-year sentence for 
tax fraud. 
1. A detailed description of the events leading to the trial 
court's decision holding Thomas in contempt of court can be found 
in Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1164-66 (Utah 1988). 
2. We note that the appellee in the instant action is not the 
original plaintiff. Richard A. Von Hake was the original 
plaintiff in Von Hake I but upon his death, appellee became 
trustee of the Von Hake 1987 Trust and is suing to renew the 
original judgment in that capacity. 
P'ASTON 
Piston presented this court—coincidentally, this very 
panel—with its first opportunity to determine whether Utah 
appellate courts "may dismiss a civil appeal when the appellant 
is in contempt of a trial court order in the same action," 
Piston v. Piston. 790 P. 2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis 
added). In P'Aston, the trial court held the appellant in 
contempt of court because she was "purposely hiding herself from 
the jurisdiction of the Court and from service." I£. at 592. 
Accordingly, the trial court entered a formal order of commitment 
and issued a bench warrant for appellant's arrest. Subsequently, 
appellant filed an appeal from the divorce decree entered by the 
trial court. We held that the appeal would be dismissed in 
thirty days if within that time appellant did not bring herself 
within the process of the trial court. I£. at 595. In so doing, 
we stressed that appellant was not being denied her right to an 
appeal under Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, 
but instead was merely being required to submit herself to the ~ 
lawful process of the trial court and to satisfy that court's 
concerns as a prerequisite to exercising her right to an appeal. 
Id. at 594. 
CONTEMPT 
In his memorandum, Thomas urges this court not to dismiss 
his appeal on two grounds, both of which focus on the alleged 
inapplicability of P'Aston to the instant matter.3 First, Thomas 
3. An additional concern surfaced at oral argument, namely that 
our record does not establish that Thomas ever actually received 
notice of the Utah Supreme Court's decision affirming the 
criminal contempt determination. Any concern regarding Thomas's 
awareness of the Court's decision and consequently his need to 
submit himself to the trial court is allayed by our reasoning in 
P'Aston v. P'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990). In P'Aston. 
we stated that where the party has initially been served in a 
case and is represented by counsel, service on the party's 
attorney of an order to show cause why the party should not be 
held in contempt is sufficient. 790 P.2d at 592. Moreover, we 
recognized that even if an attorney is unaware of the whereabouts 
of his or her client and is only authorized to represent the 
client on appeal, service on the attorney alone is adequate to 
sustain a contempt order entered against the client. P'Aston, 
790 P.2d at 592-93. We believe this reasoning reflects the 
simple proposition that an attorney is the agent of the client 
and knowledge of any material fact possessed by the attorney is 
(continued...) 
asserts that this case is different from Piston because unlike 
Piston, in which the contempt occurred in the very action from 
which the appeal was taken, albeit for failure to comply with 
post-judgment directives of the court, the appeal here is 
arguably in an action different from the one in which the 
contempt occurred, namely a subsequent action to renew the 
judgment entered in the case out of which the contempt arose. 
Second, Thomas claims that his circumstances are unlike those 
present in D'Aston because in P/Aston there was no discernible 
obstacle preventing the appellant from complying with the trial 
court's order, whereas, in the present case, Thomas's 
incarceration makes it physically impossible for him to submit 
himself to the trial court within thirty days. Thus, Thomas 
concludes that because a dismissal conditioned on submitting 
himself to the district court would necessarily be fruitless, we 
cannot dismiss his appeal. 
We disagree that these arguable distinctions take the 
instant matter out of the compass of the P'Aston rule. Thomas 
convinces us that conditioning dismissal on his appearance within 
thirty days would be fruitless; he does not convince us that he 
should be spared the dismissal of his appeal. 
A. Action to Renew Judgment 
Thomas first argues that an action to renew a judgment is an 
action separate from the action out of which the judgment arose. 
In P'Aston, this court's decision dealt with the limited 
situation in which the appellant was in contempt of a trial 
3. (..•continued) 
imputed to the client. Runae v. Fox, 796 P.2d 1143, 1147 (N.M. 
App. 1990). See Alexander v. Russo, 571 P.2d 350, 358 (Kan. App. 
1977); Lanae v. Hickman. 544 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Nev. 1976); Mahoney 
v. Linder, 514 P.2d 901, 904 (Or. App. 1973); Haller v. Wallis, 
573 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). 
We see no reason why a different rule should apply to the 
present situation. As Thomas was represented by counsel on his 
appeal of the contempt order, and no claim has been raised that 
his counsel was unaware of the Courts decision or the need for 
Thomas to submit himself to the trial court (an untenable 
proposition since copies of Supreme Court decisions are routinely 
sent to the attorneys of record in the action and, in the 
unlikely event of misdelivery, counsel would have seen the 
published decision anyway in the course of reviewing the advance 
sheets), we hold that Thomas is properly chargeable with 
knowledge of the decision and consequently of his obligation to 
serve his outstanding sentence. 
court's order issued in the same action, 790 P.2d at 593. 
Indeed, some jurisdictions limit the authority of courts to 
dismiss a contemnor's appeal to just such circumstances. See 
Bonn v. Bonn, 529 P.2d 851, 354 (Wash. App. 1974) (holding that a 
contemnor has access to the courts to present a new and 
independent matter). 
However, the majority rule expands this doctrine somewhat 
and also allows dismissal of a contemnor's appeal if the contempt 
arose in a collateral proceeding. In Steed v. Woods. 475 S.W.2d 
814 (Tex. App. 1972), for example, the court stated that it was 
convinced that the better reasoning supports 
the majority rule that an appellate court, in 
the absence of a constitutional or statutory 
prohibition, is vested with the implied power 
to deny the assistance of its processes to an 
appellant who persists in contumaciously 
defying either the order attempted to be 
appealed from or a collateral order emanating 
from the same cause of action. 
Id. at 816 (emphasis added). In Woods, the court held that where 
the appellant stood in contempt of a prior custody order entered 
in a divorce action, her appeal from a subsequent community 
property division award, arising out of the same divorce 
proceeding, would be dismissed. Id. at 817. 
Thomas urges this court to consider a renewal proceeding a 
separate action because it is commenced by the filing of a new 
complaint and summons. See Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). We refuse to 
do so. It is clear in the instant case that the renewal judgment 
appealed from arises, ultimately, from the same cause of action 
that culminated in the original judgment. Thus, we could 
consider the renewal action a collateral proceeding and dismiss 
Thomas's appeal under the Woods rationale. However, we believe 
the better line of reasoning, which is followed by Utah and the 
majority of American jurisdictions, treats a renewal action as 
simply a continuation of the original proceeding. 
Under Utah law, "[a] renewal is not an attempt to enforce, 
collect, or expand the original judgment." Barber v. Emporium 
Partnership. 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (holding that an 
action to renew a judgment against a debtor does not violate the 
automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code). Instead, in 
seeking to renew a judgment, a party is "only trying to maintain 
the status quo by preventing the judgment's lapse under the 
statute of limitations." Id. Accordingly, Utah law treats a 
renewal action, at least in other contexts, as merely a 
continuation of the original proceeding and not as a new and 
independent action. 
The adherence of American jurisdictions to this position is 
unmistakable in cases dealing with questions of in personam • 
jurisdiction. See, e.g.. Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 45 
N.E.2d 651, 653 (111. 1942) (action to renew a money judgment is 
not a new suit but a continuation of the old one); Bahan v. 
Younastown Sheet & Tube Co., 191 So. 2d 668, 670 (La. App. 1966) 
(proceeding to revive a money judgment entered against a 
nonresident judgment debtor is not a new action but is only a 
proceeding to continue the original action) ; State v. Kirkwood.**^ 
239 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. 1951) (en banc) (action to revive a 
divorce is not a new action but is merely a continuation of and 
supplementary to the original proceeding); n(ronstadt v. 
Kronstadt,/570 A.2d 485, 487-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) 
(process to revive a judgment for support arrearages and partial 
property settlement is simply a continuation of the original 
action); Berlv v. sias.i/255 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1953) (actiorr 
to renew a money judgment is not an independent suit but merely a 
continuation of the original suitl :,/t)uffv v. Hartsock, 46 S.E.2d 
570, 574 (Va. 1948) (proceeding to revive a judgment lien against 
real estate is to be treated as a continuation of the original 
suit). Likewise, the connection between the original action and 
the renewal action in the instant case is simply too close to 
ignore merely because a new complaint is filed and a new civil 
number assigned to the renewal action. 
It is immaterial whether we designate a renewal proceeding 
as a continuation of the original proceeding or as a collateral 
order. See Woods. 475 S.W.2d at 816. Either characterization 
yields the same result: the D'Aston rule is applicable. 
B. Present Inability to Discharge Contempt 
Thomas's second assertion is that D'Aston is inapplicable 
because even if he now wanted to submit himself to the trial 
court, he cannot do so as a result of his incarceration, whereas 
in D'Aston, there was no impediment to compliance other than the 
appellant's own refusal to do so.4 
4. In making this argument, Thomas chooses to overlook that for 
over five years there was no impediment to his bringing himself 
into compliance with the lawful process of this state's judiciary 
other than his own refusal to do so. His incarceration in 
California is an excellent reason for not appearing at the Kane 
County Jail, toilet kit in hand, to discharge his obligation. 
The argument borders on the disingenuous, however, for the simple 
(continued...) 
Utah case law recognizes the general rule that Ma party who 
is in contempt will not be heard by the court when he wishes to 
make a motion or [be] grant[ed] a favor." Baker v. Baker. 224 
P.2d 192f 194 (Utah 1950). Accord Johnson v. Johnson. 560 P.2d 
1132f 1134 (Utah 1977). Nonetheless, Utah has chosen to follow a 
majority of jurisdictions in allowing the contemnor time to 
comply with the trial court's order before dismissing the appeal. 
D'Aston v, D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590, 593-95 (Utah App. 1990) (30 
days to comply) (citing Stewart v. Stewart. 372 P.2d 697f 700 
(Ariz. 1962) (en banc) (30 days to comply); Tobin v. Casaus. 275 
P.2d 792f 795 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (30 days to comply); 
Greenwood v. Greenwood. 464 A.2d 771, 774 (Conn. 1983) (30 days 
to comply); Pasin v. Pasin. 517 So. 2d 742, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (15 days to comply); In re Marriage of Marks. 420 
N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (111. App. 1981) (30 days to comply); 
Henderson v. Henderson. 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Mass. 1952) (30 days 
to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas. 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Neb. 1975) 
(20 days to comply); Hemenwav v. Hemenwav. 339 A.2d 247, 250 
(R.I. 1975) (30 days to comply); strange v. Strange. 464 S.W.2<S 
216, 219 (Tex. civ. App. 1970) (per curiam) (10 days to comply); 
Pike v, Piker 167 P.2d 401, 404 (Wash. 1946) (10 days to 
comply)). A court's rationale in dismissing an appeal if the 
contempt persists beyond the grace period is that it would be a 
flagrant abuse of the principles of equity and the due 
administration of justice to allow a party who flaunts court 
orders to seek judicial aid. Piston. 790 P.2d at 593. 
In D'Astonr we recognized that the appellant was not 
claiming that she was unable to comply with the trial courts 
order, id. at 594, as Thomas is claiming here. While it is 
generally true that an individual should not be penalized for 
circumstances beyond one's control, see Stewart, 372 P.2d at 700, 
this is not Thomas's situation. Although Thomas may have a valid 
excuse for not complying with the trial court's order since April 
12. 1993. while he has been incarcerated, Thomas has no excuse 
for his failure to submit himself during the entire five years 
preceding his out-of-state incarceration. All parties to this 
appeal agree that a provisional dismissal, conditioned upon 
Thomas's failure to physically present himself to the trial court 
within thirty days, would be an exercise in futility. From this 
common ground, the parties quickly diverge. Thomas argues that 
4. (...continued) 
reason that this excuse has been available to Thomas only since 
April 12, 1993. Notwithstanding his difficulties with the 
federal government, there was ample opportunity for Thomas, in 
the half decade preceding his imprisonment on federal charges, to 
make his peace with the Sixth District Court if he had any 
sincere desire to do so. 
D'Aston cannot be applied and his appeal cannot be dismissed. 
Appellee urges that the futility of a thirty-day grace period 
dictates an outright dismissal. 
Applying the sound rule of D'Aston, we agree with appellee 
and dispense with the formality of a thirty-day grace period 
because Thomas concedes he cannot possibly avail himself of it. 
SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL 
Although neither party guestioned the power of this court to 
dismiss Thomas's appeal sua sponte,5 we pause to give a brief 
summary of the firm legal basis for our action. While Utah's 
appellate courts have not considered whether they may dismiss a 
civil appeal sua sponte when the appellant is in contempt of a 
trial court order, other jurisdictions have recognized that 
appellate courts are entitled to dismiss the appeals of 
contemnors sua sponte. 
In Greenwood v. Greenwood, 464 A.2d 771 (Conn. 1983), the ^ 
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that it would dismiss 
plaintiff's appeal, sua sponte, if the plaintiff did not comply 
with the trial court's orders within thirty days. Id. at 774. 
In so doing, the court noted the broad discretion vested in the 
courts when deciding whether contemptuous conduct warrants 
dismissal of an appeal. Id. at 773. The court stated that 
"[a]lthough the defendant never made a motion to dismiss the 
appeal, this court is not limited in its disposition of a case to 
claims raised by the parties and has frequently acted sua sponte 
upon grounds of which the parties were not previously apprised." 
Id. Moreover, the court noted the plaintiff was not prejudiced 
by its action because the conditional nature of the dismissal 
provided plaintiff with a reasonable opportunity to save her 
appeal by submitting herself to the trial court.6 Id. at 773-74. 
See 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt § 226 (1990) (appellate court, in 
the exercise of its inherent authority, may decline to entertain 
5. In D'Aston, appellee had affirmatively moved for dismissal in 
view of appellant's contempt. 790 P.2d at 591. 
6. This same line of reasoning has been followed in appellate 
court decisions affirming a trial court's sua sponte dismissal of 
a contemnor's action. See Hahn v. Hahn, 144 N.E.2d 499, 501 
(Ohio App. 1956) (affirming the trial court's sua sponte 
dismissal of a contemnor's motion for a change of custody). See 
also Botany v. Heerincra, 521 F. Supp. 1369, 1369-70 (E.D. Wis. 
1981) (dismissing plaintiff's civil action sua sponte and with 
prejudice due to plaintiff's criminal contempt conviction). 
an appeal by a litigant who stands in contempt in the proceedings 
sought to be appealed). See also Steed v. Woods. 475 S.W.2d 814, 
816-17 (Tex. App. 1972) (appellate court may deny review to a 
contumacious appellant in the exercise of the appellate court's 
implied power to use its processes to induce compliance with a 
related order) (relying on National Union of Marine Cooks and 
Stewards v. Arnold. 348 U.S. 37f 75 S. Ct. 92 (1954)); State v. 
Common Pleas Court of Lorain County. 235 N.E.2d 232, 235 (Ohio 
1968) (within inherent powers of court to deny judicial 
assistance to litigant who refuses to comply with court orders). 
The rationale behind allowing a court the discretion to 
dismiss a contemnor's appeal stems from the 
rash of modern instances where court orders 
are disobeyed with impunity and respect for 
the law and the courts [is] thereby weakened. 
It seems, therefore, that it is the duty of 
the appellate courts to see to it that every 
assistance is extended to the courts of the 
[state] so that orders are meticulously 
carried out as otherwise the dignity of the 
judiciary, the majesty of the law and its 
enforcement are clearly undermined. 
Commonwealth v. Beemer, 188 A.2d 475, 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962). 
Although Beemer did not present a situation where the court was 
acting sua sponte, the court's reasoning applies with equal force 
to a sua sponte dismissal. Given the duty of the appellate 
courts to protect the integrity of the judiciary, it would be 
bizarre if our ability to do so were severely restricted by a 
requirement that we could only dismiss a contemnor's appeal if 
favored with a motion from an appellee. Thus, we believe it is 
well within this court's discretionary power to dismiss Thomas's 
appeal sua sponte. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas's long-standing failure to comply with the trial 
court's order and his present inability to do so require this 
court to dismiss his appeal. We find no merit in his claims that 
the contempt order was issued in a separate action or that his 
incarceration somehow precludes this court from dismissing his 
appeal. Therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed. 
Gregory JfT Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
m- 3U£*pL> 
Regnal W. Garff , Judge 
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ORDER 
Case No. 920643-CA 
The Court ot Appeals entered an opinion herein on 10 August 
1993. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. 
By unpublished minute entry dated 2 December 1993, the 
Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the matter to the 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
Petitioner Thomas's petition for writ of 
certiorari is granted on the issue that he 
was unable to brief the issue of why his 
appeal should not be dismissed. On that 
limited i:sue, the case is remanded to the 
court or appeals with instructions to allow 
parties to orief the issue why the appeal 
should not be dismissed. 
The order went on to state that "the court of appeals' decision 
is affirmed in all other respects.11 
As we view the Supreme Court's order, the following aspects 
of this court's decision, inter alia, have been affirmed: 
1. Defendant is in contempt of the district court 
and had adequate notice of the Supreme Court's 
affirmance of the criminal contempt judgment against 
him; 
2. D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 
1990), correctly states the law, namely, that one who 
is in contempt of a trial court may have his appeal 
dismissed, at least if such contempt is not purged, or 
the trial court is not otherwise satisfied, within 
thirty days; 
3. Defendant's contempt is properly of issue in 
the instant appeal, either because the judgment renewal 
proceeding represents a continuation of the initial 
proceeding or because it is collateral to the original 
action. 
Accordingly, the only issue before the court on remand and 
to be briefed by the parties is whether dismissal of the appeal 
is an appropriate sanction under all the circumstances. In that 
regard, the parties shall address the following sub-issues: 
1. Whether D'Aston actually reguires a 30-day 
grace period tor contumacious litigants or whether it 
merely permits such a grace period, in the discretion 
of the appellate court; 
2. If a 30-day grace period is otherwise 
required, whether it may be dispensed with in 
situations where it is physically impossible for 
defendant to bring himself into timely compliance with 
the trial court's orders and process, including in the 
situation of detenaant's incarceration out of state; 
3. If incarceration out of state might in some 
instances preclude dismissal and require instead a 
grace period Longer than 30 days, whether the result 
should be different in cases where defendant had ample 
opportunity, pre-incarceration, to discharge the 
contempt sanction pending against him. 
Appellant shah rile his brief within thirty days of the 
date hereof. Appellee shall thereafter have 30 days to file a 
responsive brief. Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be 
filed within thirty days of the date of appellee's brief. All 
briefs shall be limited to the issues outlined and described 
herein. 
^ Dated this ILS day of January, 1994 
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DETERMIHITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const. Art. I Sec. 9 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall 
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Const. Art. VIII Sec. 5 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statutef and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdic-
tion of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provied by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the 
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from 
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
